THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY DURING THE ADMINISTRATION
OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

November 1963 - January 1969

Volume I - Administrative History

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Introduction

by Bertrand M. Harding
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It is less than five years since President Lyndon Johnson called for a declaration of "unconditional War on Poverty in America." But in that time, the programs instituted by his Administration have changed the fabric of life for millions of our citizens, and have reshaped not only our institutions but our very thinking about poverty and the poor.

At the very center of this rapid and, at times, convulsive institutional change has been the agency President Johnson created to administer the anti-poverty program, and which, to strengthen and protect its independence, he placed in the Executive Office of the President.

The Office of Economic Opportunity has never, in the five years of its existence, been free from controversy or criticism. Nor has it limited itself to the safe channels of coordination, study, or consensus. It has, from the very outset, taken the role of advocate and activist on behalf of all the poor and all of their problems. Not content to leave education to the educators, medicine to the doctors, law to the lawyers, or the community to the politicians—it has sought to involve itself and great numbers of concerned citizens in better ways of adapting these fields to the needs of the poor. And so, it was OEO which developed Head Start and Upward Bound;
Neighborhood Health Centers and Legal Services, Community Action
and a host of related programs. In the main, professional establish-
ments were quick to give their support and assistance. But, without
the trail-blazing efforts of OEO, the focus on the problems of the
poor might have remained diffused.

The history of the War on Poverty, then, is one which com-
presses into a brief span, an entire social revolution. It is a
"quiet revolution" which has been carried out in meeting halls and
classrooms; town halls and neighborhood centers. When there has
been violence in the streets, poverty workers have sought to calm
tensions, bridge barriers and open channels of communications between
those in power and those frustrated by their powerlessness. In a
thousand communities, in every state, in almost every county, it
has offered self-help as a substitute for welfare, and participation
as a substitute for acceptance.

This record of the genesis, the events and the personalities of
the War on Poverty, is an honest attempt to see the first five years
of this infant effort with clarity and integrity. The warts and the
blemishes are there; the conflicts and the frustrations—as well as
the victories and the justifications. Never before had a major nation
attempted such a feat. To put an end to the poverty of the minority,
at a time when the majority were enjoying their greatest prosperity.
To enlist the services of a million volunteers at a time when they
had earned the right to untroubled leisure. To change the direction
and alter the scope of established institutions which were serving adequately the needs of the vast majority. And to bring into sight and into mind, a segment of our society which could well have remained hidden and ignored.

There will never again be an excuse for "The Other America" of wasted lives and blighted hopes. There will never again be a justification for suppressing the legitimate aspirations of black Americans, or Mexican Americans, or American Indians, or the poor white Americans of the rural backwash. In March of 1964, President Johnson said:

The War on Poverty is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance. It is an effort to allow them to develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to develop and use ours, so that they can share as others share in the promise of the nation.

This history of the Office of Economic Opportunity is a record of how well that promise has been kept, an analysis of how far there is still to go, and a challenge to those who will come after, to proceed with determination--building on the foundation of what has gone before--to get the job done for all time.
Foreword

The History of the Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson was completed under the supervision of Acting Deputy Director Robert Perrin. It was directed by Herbert Kramer. The general editor was Bennett Schiff. The work was written by Bennett Schiff and Stephen Goodell with the research assistance of James F. Donnelly and Mary Jo Kelly. Assisting secretaries were Pamela Hebson and Florence Johnston.
Chapter One

The Beginning

Poverty Discovered

In his 1964 State of the Union address, President Lyndon Baines Johnson officially launched the war on poverty: "This Administration today here and now declares unconditional war on poverty, and I urge this Congress and all Americans to join with me in that effort. It will not be a short or easy struggle--no single weapon or strategy will suffice--but we shall not rest until that war is won. The richest nation on earth can afford to win it. We cannot afford to lose it." For the first time in history a President had proposed a policy committing the country to the specific task of eliminating poverty. The result of a combination of factors in the early 1960's, the war against poverty brought to a "crescendo the theme of compassion and concern of man for his fellow man, and of big government for little people."

The origins of the poverty war, some writers have suggested, begin with the era of the Depression. The economic collapse that began in 1929 acted as a powerful catalyst in the "modern American reaction against the idea of individualism and against the well-established institutions which gave that idea reality." The 1930's, a time of universal hardship, social dislocation and despair, provided an atmosphere conducive to drastic reforms, and the New Deal initiated a variety of precedent-breaking programs based on the premise that the

national interest was best served by ensuring the well-being and security of all Americans.

It is important to note that the Depression unemployed were primarily skilled workers. The immediate need, therefore, was to provide jobs, not create skills. This task was temporarily resolved by the numerous relief and recovery programs, a strategy that assumed employment opportunity facilitated economic recovery. The effect was to bypass the hard-core poverty-stricken--those without job skills or the proper motivation--the bystanders, the "unworthy poor." Thus, during the Thirties and beyond, literally millions of impoverished Americans failed to benefit directly from the social and economic legislation of the Thirties--elderly citizens not covered by Social Security or whose public and private benefits did not support a decent life; the chronically unemployed; workers displaced by improved technology or working at poverty jobs; and a minority of farmers, Negroes and the young.2

With the urgency of the war came a drastic revision of priorities, and the rash of progressive programs came to a halt. By 1945, repudiation of much of the philosophy and programs of the New Deal was an accomplished fact. Post-war America viewed the persistence of poverty and unemployment as the aberrations of a malfunctioning economy, more related to unwise government policy than to inherent structural causes. The concerns of the mid-century focused around the problems engendered by the cold war, and successive administrations, "faced as they were with the great problems of adjustment

to the post-war world, both at home and abroad, and finding the nation generally prosperous," felt no great pressure to indulge in social and economic legislation. Thoughtful writers of the Fifties concentrated on social developments—the corporate society, middle-class anxieties, problems of leisure, conformity, status and the like. Conventional economic wisdom stressed fiscal problems of balanced budgets, spending versus tight money policies, taxation and pump-priming. Emphasis was given to economic growth and expansion, and political action was based upon the general problems of inflation and unemployment—not poverty per se.3

The "Haunted Fifties" was, by some accounts, an era of self-congratulation for the achievements of abundance. John Kenneth Galbraith, for one, looked upon the residue of poverty in affluent America as a "remarkable" phenomena, but no longer a "universal or massive affliction." It was, the Harvard economist noted, "more nearly an afterthought." Galbraith's message fell on ears "which seemed eager to hear that social problems didn't really exist;" and, as the University of Chicago economist Theodore Shultz observed, the Fifties was a time

of "directionless and passive complacency toward domestic problems."4

Not until the Sixties did a group of writers, "whose awareness of the realities of income and poverty was keener than most," attempt a critical analysis of the American economy and the subculture of poverty. One such writer was Gabriel Kolko. In Wealth and Power in America, he showed that statistical evaluations of income failed to "tell all there was to say about poverty." Another was Michael Harrington, whose book, The Other America, graphically described the quality of life of the poor, revealing a subculture of poverty that was perpetual, cyclical, and beyond reach.5

Harrington sketched a "sympathetic portrait of the chronically poor," caught in the "vicious trap of circumstances, a way of life in which one learned not to care and often discovered that sacrifice and struggle just made things worse." Harrington helped redefine poverty in human, understandable terms, and he emphasized the systematic and structural causes of poverty—environment, not the individual, contri-

4 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: The New American Library; 1958), pp. 250, 251, 258; Margaret S. Gordon, Poverty in America (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company; 1965), pp. xv-xvii; An exception was Edward R. Murrow's "Harvest of Shame" documentary dealing with conditions of migrant farmers. Daniel P. Moynihan notes that in 1956, Governor Harriman of New York called for an "Attack on Poverty" in his Annual Message to the State Legislature: "The data he cited were of almost exactly the same order and magnitude as those to which President Johnson called attention in his Message to the Congress eight years later. . . But the time had not come for an attack on poverty." See "Poverty and Progress," The American Scholar, Fall, 1964.

buted to one's status in society. The Other America viewed the individual as victim, not a causal agent of poverty. The poor, Harrington wrote, suffered more than mere material deprivation. They were subjected to a "persistent and degrading suppression of their living standards and whatever humanity they once possessed." They were both estranged and invisible: "they think and feel differently; they look upon a different America than the middle class looks upon."6

Galbraith's Affluent Society had employed a $1,000 poverty income criterion; but writers like Harrington, Gunnar Myrdal, and Leon Keyserling revised the figure to embrace a substantially larger portion of the population. What emerged was a new image of America, of more than 30 million citizens inhabiting a landscape of deprivation and misery. Theirs was a world of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, high infant and adult mortality rates, hopeless futures and general despair. The world of the poor in affluent America was an aberration, and had little in common with the world of the middle class. To be poor in America was to suffer a debilitating exclusiveness: as Walter Reuther put it, "poverty in America is more destructive of human values — because (it) not only robs people of economic opportunity but spiritually. They are invisible citizens of America. When they are set aside they are denied the sense of belonging and the sense of participating as useful members of our society. They are denied their measure of

human dignity." The American Dream for the poor was a nightmare. Children of migrant workers, American Indians on government reservations, Appalachian miner's families, Americans of Spanish descent, Negroes in both North and South—all were testament to that fact.7

Myrdal, Kolko, Keyserling and Harrington were among the vanguard to expose the realities of impoverishment of one fifth of the nation's population. The revised image of the country shattered the complacency of Americans, who could no longer "conceal from themselves (the fact) that there is in the United States a large 'underclass' of poor and destitute people in the urban and rural slums who are largely cut off from the life and aspirations of the nation." In the Sixties, Americans had to face the disturbing paradox—poverty in the midst of plenty. This fact, inconsistent with the nation's espoused moral ideals of equality, was alien to the nation's self-image that denied the possibility of widespread poverty.8

While the task of identifying poverty was underway, new strategies for combatting it were being formed. "In case after case," wrote Harrington, "it has been documented that one cannot deal with the various components of poverty in isolation, changing this or that condition but leaving the basic structure intact." The primary need was a

7 Harrington, The Other America; Leon Keyserling, Poverty and Deprivation in the United States (Conference on Economic Progress; 1962); Leon Keyserling, Progress of Poverty (Conference on Economic Progress; 1964); Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to Affluence (New York: Pantheon Books; 1963); Statement of Walter Reuther before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, April 8, 1964.

displacement of the old by new communities, "substituting a human environment for the inhuman that now exists." Any strategy designed to break the cycle of poverty had to account for the interrelatedness of the social, economic, legal, educational and psychological problems that plagued the poor. All segments of society had to be involved in a "many-pronged attack on these problems." 9

The cyclical view of poverty, the recognition of its massive proportions, and the acceptance of a comprehensive approach to strike at the fundamental causes of the problem came to be a shared consensus on the part of sociologists, social workers, economists and academics generally during the early part of the Sixties. What remained was for their insights to become a part of a national dialogue. The story of intellectual influence in the higher councils of government is a curious one indeed. 10

Genesis of a Program


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10 Moynihan, in "The Professors and the Poor," Commentary, August, 1968, p. 20, writes: ". . .more than most government programs, the war on poverty--rather like the war on Vietnam--was pre-eminently the work of intellectuals--specifically those liberal, policy-oriented intellectuals who gather in Washington, and in a significant sense came to power in the early 1960's under the Presidency of John F. Kennedy."
Security Act. The opening battle, Kennedy had remarked, against suffering and deprivation had been won in the 1930's; but the war against poverty and degradation was not yet over. In 1960 the Democratic platform singled out the problem, and in Kennedy's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, three references were made to poverty, capped by the ringing admonition: "If the free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich." Early in the Kennedy administration efforts to develop ideas to combat unemployment and related problems began.11

In 1961, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz urged a national program to eliminate poverty and ignorance. In the summer of 1962 the Conference on Economic Progress published a detailed analysis of poverty in America. Using annual income guidelines to measure poverty, the Conference found that over one fifth of the nation's population lived in poverty. The 1960 Census showed that thirty-seven million Americans were impoverished, one third of them children. Statistics on income distribution betrayed the reality of national abundance, revealing that the poor were left virtually untouched by federal, state and local programs. Occupational differentials were widening in many areas, especially in the Negro communities.12

12 Moynihan, ibid.; Terry Sanford, "Poverty's Challenge to the States," Anti-poverty Programs, p. 78; Keyserling, Poverty and Deprivation.
President Kennedy directed studies to be made on poverty, authorizing the formation and funding of special study groups to investigate the related problems of the poor. One such group was the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, an outgrowth of the 1961 Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act. It established a small program staff in the Justice Department under the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and his Special Assistant David Hackett. By the terms of the 1961 act, fifteen million dollars was provided to finance live experiments in "community action projects."\(^{13}\)

This concept of "community action" had its roots in unique theories of social action and social psychology that had been germinating in some universities for the past several decades. Community action was based partly on the view that the principle hope for the poor was for them to "develop sufficient strength and skill to maneuver themselves, largely by their own efforts, out of where they are and into something better. Corollary to this is the belief that if any reforms are feasible in the existing social system they will have to be accomplished through vesting poor people with the political and administrative power necessary to force the changes they consider important upon the power structure.\(^{14}\)

In the early 1960's, the Ford Foundation's "gray areas" program—based on the theory that poverty was the product of related economic,


social, and psychological problems—had proved the worth of community action as a way to attack poverty at its source. The North Carolina Fund conducted a similar effort on a broader, statewide basis. These "demonstration" precedents were incorporated into the Attorney General's interdepartmental committee's experiments. Based on the Ford Foundation philosophy, the staff sponsored modestly funded projects of community action in a number of cities, one of which was the Mobilization for Youth on the Lower East Side of New York City. Through the various urban "pilot projects" operating in the early Sixties, a new vocabulary was developed. Words like "comprehensive," and "coordinated" came to be "enshrined as the inviolable precepts of the successful poverty program." Moreover, the output of volumes of materials and project proposals greatly increased, adding significantly to "the state of the art of social analysis."15

What had begun as efforts to deal with a behavioral problem broadened in scope. Analysts discovered beneath the symptoms of delinquency the deeper problems of teenage unemployment, slum schools, ghetto living, and broken families. Many believed that government had the capacity and the responsibility to alleviate or eliminate these problems. The concrete results of such studies were the 1961 Area Redevelopment Act, emphasizing the "elimination of poverty rather than amelioration of some of its effects." Economically depressed areas were to be revitalized by attacking structural unemployment through the extension of

loans, grants, and technical aid. The 1962 Manpower Development and Training Act stressed skills preparation, whereby the impact of technological displacement and related forces was met by job training and retraining. And the Vocational Education Act of 1963 provided vocational training for young people in a more sophisticated technology.16

In 1963 began a curious and apocalyptic story. The first two years of President Kennedy's administration had been characterized by a preoccupation with foreign affairs. Questions of military strength—foreign policy and aid, the missile gap—and key events—the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin situation, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Peace Corps, the Cuban missile crisis—had relegated domestic affairs to second priority attention. By 1963, for a variety of reasons—including the civil rights movement, the steel controversy, and the tax cut package which "raised issues of domestic policy"—the focus of the Administration's attention shifted.17


Harrington's *Other America* was published in 1962. Dwight MacDonald, in a *New Yorker* article entitled "Our Invisible Poor," reviewed the book among others of the same topic. "In the last year," he wrote, "we seem to have suddenly awakened, rubbing our eyes like Rip Van Winkle, to the fact that mass poverty exists, and that it is one of our two gravest social problems." Poverty denied real citizenship to a large segment of society: "If that right is denied, 'it impoverishes us all.'" Placing the blame squarely on the "doorstep of the White House," he charged that Federal programs were grossly inadequate. More serious was the lack of an aroused public opinion. The need, he concluded, was for greater federal programs to aid the poor.\textsuperscript{18}

MacDonald later recalled that by request the *New Yorker* reprinted over 20,000 copies for sociologists, economists, social workers, trade unions, and private citizens. Inquiries emanated from Washington, one from Theodore Sorensen, Special Assistant to the President. According to Washington legend, and economist Ben S. Seligman, Sorensen was so moved, or astute, that he at once brought the article to Kennedy's attention. Thus, so the story runs, was born the war on poverty.

Within a month Kennedy proposed a national youth service program drawn from the experience of the Peace Corps. The National Service Program became the special project of a Cabinet-level study group under the Attorney General. Begun in November, 1962, under the Presidential instruction that "we shall be judged more by what we do at home than

\textsuperscript{18} Dwight MacDonald, "Invisible Poor," *Poverty in America; Weeks, Job Corps*, p. 40.
what we preach abroad," the study group reported to the President in January, 1963.19

Kennedy's State of the Union address and a Special Message Relative to the Nation's Youth referred to the feasibility of establishing a national service corps to provide aid in mental hospitals, Indian reservations, centers for the aged, and for young delinquents, Appalachia, migratory labor communities and elsewhere. The President urged upon Congress the necessity for such a proposal, but the Administration bill failed to pass both Houses. The significance of the National Service Corps program was reflected in the Study Group's report to the President. Explicitly stated was a clear recognition of the poverty problem, accompanied by a description of the hardships faced by one-sixth of the nation. The report contained a brief bibliography of poverty, attempted to dramatize the plight of the needy, and by implication suggested the need for a program of broader scope and depth.20

Another version of the inspirational force behind the Kennedy poverty "program" was given by Richard Boone, a member of the 1964 task force on poverty. According to Boone, Kennedy had been greatly impressed by Homer Bigart's New York Times article on Appalachian problems. On April 9, 1963, Kennedy authorized the President's Appalachian Regional Commission, bringing national attention to the problems of


that region. In October, the President instructed Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., then Undersecretary of Commerce, to put together a comprehensive program for Eastern Kentucky. Roosevelt consulted with various Executive departments, and initiated a crash program on November 13, with allocations of $16 million for a number of projects including job training, food distribution, housing and special welfare, and a Christmas-vacation domestic peace corps utilizing college students. This provided an action model for future thinking about organization and implementation.21

Bigart's article may have been the "trigger" that led to the formation of a comprehensive attack on the poverty problem; however, there was no single catalyst. Eric Talmach and Hyman Bookbinder, two task force members in 1964, recall that the Harrington book got to Kennedy by way of MacDonald's article and a memo from Walter Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. Nevertheless, a combination of the articles and The Other America prompted Presidential interest, and within weeks Kennedy directed Heller to embark on a study of potential poverty programs. In early May, 1963, assisted by Robert Lampham, a University of Wisconsin economist who had studied income distribution of the poor, the Council of Economic Advisors began such a study. In June, 1963, Heller asked Lampham, "What lines of action might make up

a practical Kennedy anti-poverty program?" Lampham's guidelines formed the basis for what followed.\textsuperscript{22}

At about the same time, the Bureau of the Budget became "dominant in the planning of the anti-poverty programs. . . because it believed that a community action program idea applied locally all over the country would offer new leverage power in coordinating resources primarily of the Federal Government." It was assumed that local structures in major urban areas could coordinate resources and function to provide leverage power "to bring federal agencies into line." It would force them to "do business with a single structure rather than doing business. . . all over the lot."\textsuperscript{23}

In mid-summer, 1963, the Budget Bureau was engaged in preparing the 1964 budget message, which was to include a section on poverty. The Budget process, one observer has noted, forced the President and his chief advisors each year to examine the relationship of government programs and national issues. Kennedy and Sorensen exploited these opportunities to force decisions in major problem areas. In September, Sorensen asked Walter Heller to "pull together for the President's consideration a set of measures which might be woven into a basic attack on the problems of poverty and waste of human resources, as part of the 1964 legislative program." Heller gathered together an informal inter-agency task force, and for two months meetings were held between Cabinet members, Budget Bureau officials, and other interested parties,

\textsuperscript{22} Time Interview: "War on Poverty," \textit{Newsweek Magazine}, February 17, 1964, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{23} Boone, "Community Action."
to establish proposals for Presidential review.24

In other parts of the Executive branch "some of the young activ-
ists most concerned with programs related to poverty started to put
their heads together," and William Capron, Staff Director of the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors, called together a small planning group to
"sift through the various program possibilities."25 The combined ef-
forts of those concerned with anti-poverty planning produced little
in the way of a constructive, formal program, and clear lines of divi-
sion developed between the Departments of Labor and Health, Education
and Welfare. Heller and Kermit Gorden, Director of the Budget Bureau, felt
the need, therefore, to conduct the poverty program outside the old-
line agencies, but there was no agreement as to the administrative form
it should take. During the fall session, while no formal organization
emerged, David Hackett, Richard Boone of the White House staff, and
Paul Ylvisaker of the Ford Foundation, pushed hard for the community
action program, convincing Heller and William Canon of the Budget Bur-
eau. Agreement was reached on one other point. The program had
been designated as "Widening Participation in Prosperity," primarily
as a way to destigmatize the national effort from the negative conno-
tations of the word "poverty." As a result, the war on poverty began

24 Moynihan, "Professors and the Poor," p. 21; Weeks, Job Corps, pp.48-51.
25 Capron, who wrote to Wirtz, Celebreeze, Weaver, Freeman, Udall, and
Robert Kennedy under Heller's name, recalled that the response was dis-
appointing, resulting in the reincarnation of all the obsolete programs
and stale ideas of the past. Interview with William Capron, Brookings
Institution, July 9, 1968.
as a "prosperity" program. 26

Throughout his last months, President Kennedy was kept informed of the discussions and planning behind the proposed poverty program. To some degree he gave to the planners an overview that could only come from his office. On October 21, 1963, Kennedy suggested to Heller the possibility that he would visit some poverty-stricken area in order to underscore the problem nationally. At his last Cabinet meeting, October 29, 1963, the President left a memo pad with the word "poverty" inscribed six times, and the word "coordination" underlined twice and enclosed in a penciled box. 27

A number of factors brought the matter to a head. Throughout the spring and summer of 1963, while Congress stifled Kennedy's social legislation (the National Service Corps and the Youth Employment Act), "the library of Dickens-like descriptions of life in poor America grew." Night Comes to the Cumberlands, by Harry Caudill, vividly depicted the shortcomings of the welfare system in Eastern Kentucky. Edgar May, Pulitzer prizewinner, wrote in The Wasted Americans what it meant to be "enveloped and surrounded" in the ghetto. In April the Committee on Youth Employment reported that the youth unemployment problem had reached crisis conditions. 28

26 An early memo by Adam Yarmolinsky, for example, indicated that "pockets of poverty" would be called "targets of opportunity." Memorandum for Mr. Shriver, February 6, 1964; Interview with Eric Tolmach, June 28, 1968; Interview with David Hackett, July 30, 1968; Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 47-48; Time Interview.

27 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 52-58.

28 Ibid., p. 43.
The Civil Rights movement, climaxing in the August March on Washington, highlighted the unrest of a disenchanted minority most affected by poverty. The Kennedy Administration, by one account, was interested in launching a national program to give the movement direction and purpose, and to translate its energies into a "virile program addressed to poverty." Moreover, a domestic program attacking poverty offered the way for productive spending on the theory that indigents could be transformed from tax-eaters to tax-payers.

The literature of poverty, the revelations of various study groups, and the animating drive that underlay the spirit of the "New Frontier"--resurrecting the democratic ideals of equality and opportunity in a free society--all combined to provide an atmosphere of public concern. What had begun as an overt concern on the part of a few social analysts had evolved into preliminary and exploratory steps taken within the Executive branch of the government. These early steps represented a concerted effort centered on the problems of the poor. The first "reconnaissance" in the war on poverty had begun. It was the "newest initiative" in an old struggle, involving new ideas, new men, and new institutions. It embodied, in Nathan Glazer's words, the "professionalization of reform in modern society."30

29 Gladwin writes, "the war on poverty as often as not operates in the shadow of the civil rights movement and it is therefore not always clear to which of these two sets of values a given set is in witness. . . . It obscures the workings of the strategy. . . ." Poverty U.S.A., pp. 18-19.

Three days before the tragic events of November 22, Walter Heller had his last conversation with the President. The mobilization of forces for a national poverty program had been underway for months, although no formal announcement had been made. A draft copy of Chapter Two of the 1964 Economic Advisor's Report lay on the President's desk. 31 The President, Heller recalled, "expressed his deep concern over the problem, and urged us to move ahead with our efforts to bring the relevant agencies of government into consensus on a program to combat poverty." Heller asked the President whether he wanted to "go forward on the assumption that the anti-poverty measure would be a part of his 1964 legislative program." His answer was an unhesitating "Yes." 32

Three days later President Kennedy was dead. On the 23rd, Heller took up the matter of the poverty program with President Johnson: "His immediate response was 'That's my kind of program...I want to move full speed ahead!'" The new President said he intended to wage total war on poverty, making it the cornerstone of his administration. Said a Kennedy Administration holdover, "The President has a great feeling for this program. It's close to his roots. Where Kennedy may have had only an intellectual appreciation of the need to eradicate poverty, Johnson had a 'gut' reaction to the basic idea." Seymour Harris, member of the 1960 President's Task Force on the Economy, noted that it

31 The 1964 Economic Advisor's Report has been called "the most important single document that has been created in the whole War on Poverty. It is a Bible." Time Interview

32 Dunne, Poverty in Plenty, p. 15; Newsweek, September 13, 1965.
was to President Johnson's credit that he "enthusiastically accepted the Kennedy-Heller program."33

The new President lost no time in carrying forward the steps initiated by his predecessor.34 Between November 24, 1963 and February 1, 1964, interagency meetings were held on the subject of poverty programs. Johnson gave his stamp of approval to the Council of Economic Advisor's Report calling for a "new federally-led effort" to combat poverty. The report recommended that government should "marshall already developed resources, focus already expressed concerns," and coordinate the "diverse attacks" on poverty by the myriad agencies engaged in health, education, housing, welfare and agriculture programs. It concluded with the assertion that the war on poverty "must be based on a change in national attitude... It is time... to allow Government to assume its responsibility for action and leadership in promoting the general welfare."35


34 Moynihan writes that, "The theme fitted perfectly into the New Deal, Populist style of Lyndon Johnson, who immediately upon taking office directed that plans for the poverty program proceed as a matter of administrative priority."; "Professors and the Poor," p. 21.

In the space of a few short months the tempo of events rapidly accelerated. At a December press conference the President told reporters that "high" on his "agenda of priority" would be "poverty legislation for the lowest income groups." And he added, "any kind of poverty will be a concern of this Administration." Johnson soon set into motion a movement within the Executive to find ways to reduce federal spending. He instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to pare defense production costs, and called for a general federal job curb.

The object was to enable a shift of federal funds from the defense budget to the poverty program. Johnson termed the reallocation of funds a form of wealth redistribution, from "those who have it to those who don't have it." The advantage was obvious: the poverty war would not require additional spending beyond what already existed. When Sargent Shriver later testified before the House committee considering the poverty bill, he was able to say that the program would "not raise the national budget by a single dollar."

The commencement of the war on poverty publically began on January 8, 1964, when President Johnson formally declared war in his State of the Union address. The President's appeal was verbalized in business-like terms. Simply stated, it was a question of sound investment:

36 Some interpreted the President's remarks as meaning taking from the "haves" and giving to the "have nots." Shriver had to explain that this meant taking from "have government programs," and not people. Letter from Shriver to Mrs. J.T. Thayer, May 7, 1964.

"$1,000 invested in salvaging an unemployable youth today can return $40,000 or more in his lifetime." Poverty, he continued, was a national problem that required the utilization of all resources available to the federal, state, and local governments—"from the court-house to the White House." The chief aim of the poverty war, he stressed, was to deal with the deep-set causes of poverty arising from the failure "to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities." The chief weapons in the war would be:

better schools, and better health, and better homes, and better training and better job opportunities to help more Americans—especially young Americans—escape from squalor and misery and unemployment rolls where other citizens help to carry them. Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptoms. . .our joint federal-local effort must pursue poverty—pursue it wherever it exists—in city slums and small towns, in sharecropper shacks, or in migrant worker camps, on Indian reservations, among whites as well as Negroes, among the young as well as the aged, in the boom towns and in the depressed areas.

By the terms of the President's proposal, the nation was obliged to strike away "the barriers to full participation in our society." Finally, the program was to be accompanied by a half-billion budget cut.38

In his first Annual Economic Report, Johnson restated the aims of the 1964 Council of Economic Advisor's report, which he sent to Congress on January 20, 1964. The report, largely an amplification of Harrington's own findings two years before, systematized the latest data to portray the picture of American poverty.

38 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 875; Of the budget cut, James Reston noted the historical and ambivalent similarities: the address sounded the "Franklin Delano Hoover" theme, revisiting the New Deal "with emphasis on the forgotten man and flashes of Roosevelt in a three-inch Hoover collar." New York Times, January 9, 1964, p. 17.
The Report pointed out that "one-fifth of our fellow citizens," or about 35 million persons, live "without hope below minimum standards of decency," having only $590 per capita income in 1962 compared with the national average of $1,900. 39 Poverty was "no purely private or local concern." It was a "social and national problem," in which the poor "inhabit a world scarcely recognizable, scarcely recognized, by the majority of their fellow Americans."

The Report made the following points:

- one-fifth of our families and nearly one-fifth of our total population were poor;

- of the poor, 44% were non-white and nearly one-half of all non-whites lived in poverty;

- the heads of over 60 percent of all poor families had only grade school educations;

- even for those denied opportunity by discrimination, education significantly raised the chance to escape from poverty. Of all non-white families headed by a person with 8 years or less of schooling, 57 percent were poor. This percentage fell to 30 for high school graduates and to 18 percent for those with some college education;

- education did not remove the effects of discrimination;

- one-third of all poor families were headed by a person over 65, and almost one-half of the families headed by such a person were poor;

- when a family and its head had several characteristics frequently associated with poverty, the chances of impoverishment were particularly high; a family headed by a Negro young woman with less than an eighth grade education was poor in 94 out of 100 cases. Even if she was white, the chances were 85 out of 100 that she and her children would be poor.

The Government established a poverty yardstick at $3,000 per year for a family of four. This broke down to about $60.00 a week. The Council had estimated typical expenditures to be: $5 per week per person would be spent for food; about $800 per year would go for housing, leaving only $1,200—less than $25 per week—for clothing, transportation, school supplies, home furnishings and supplies, medical care, personal care, recreation, insurance and other basic needs. "Obviously," the Advisors declared, "it does not exaggerate the problem of poverty to regard $3,000 as the boundary."

In 1962, there were 9.3 million families in the country who had total incomes below $3,000. More than 1.1 million families were "now raising four or more children on such an income." There were more than 5.4 million families (totaling 17 million people) with total incomes below $2,000. More than a million children came from large families with incomes of less than $2,000. And there were people living alone, the "unrelated" individuals. In 1962, 45 percent of them—or five million—had incomes of less than $1,500; and 29 percent—or more than three million—had incomes below $1,000. Thus, 33 to 35 million Americans lived at or below the boundaries of poverty in 1962—nearly one-fifth of the Nation.

The Council's report concluded with a request to "focus and coordinate our older programs and some new ones into a comprehensive long-range attack on the poverty that remains." 40

On January 21, the President submitted a $97.9 billion budget request for fiscal year 1965. In it he proposed a network of federal, state and local programs for the poverty war to be backed by an initial federal authority of $500 million of new obligational funds. In all, more than $1 billion of federal money would be concentrated on the program.41

Task Force

On Saturday, the 1st of February, President Johnson telephoned Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver, who had returned from a world trip on an Executive mission. The President asked Shriver to serve as his "personal chief of staff in the war against poverty." That afternoon, the two met, and Shriver accepted the task.42

As Chairman of the Peace Corps' Advisory Council, Johnson had had the opportunity to size up Shriver's abilities, and he liked what he saw. No one in the United States, he said later, was so ideally suited by "personality, by training, by head and heart and heels" to lead the attack on poverty. Shriver's duties would be to direct "the activities

41 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 6.

42 Capron recalls that he and Heller in December, 1963, pressed upon President Johnson the need to name somebody to head a special study group. Capron wrote a letter listing possible candidates, among whom were Terry Sanford and Dick Leibner. At the top of the list was Sargent Shriver, who had political charisma, ability on the Hill, and had demonstrated an effective style with the Peace Corps. Interview with Capron; On Shriver, see: Anthony Lewis, "Shriver Moves Into the Front Rank," New York Times Magazine, March 15, 1964; A.H. Raskin, "Generalissimo of the War on Poverty," New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1964; Murray Kempton, "The Essential Sargent Shriver," New Republic, March 28, 1964.
of all executive departments and agencies involved in the program against poverty."

In a letter of February 11, appointing Shriver to be his Special Assistant in the anti-poverty effort, Johnson outlined some of his duties. "As my representative," he wrote, "you will direct the activities of all executive departments and agencies involved in the program against poverty. You will also be my representative in presenting to the Congress the Administration's views with respect to necessary legislation." Indicative of the importance the President gave the program, he empowered Shriver to attend Cabinet meetings. Further:

You will also undertake the coordination and integration of the federal program with the activities of state and local governments and of private persons, including the Foundations, private business and industry, labor unions, and civic groups and organizations. I ask that you invite their close cooperation; that to the extent that they desire, you integrate their efforts with our work on the federal level; and that you encourage joint planning, joint programs and joint administration, wherever feasible.

If this were done, the nation could then solve the problem of poverty "with the greatest possible speed, efficiency, and economy." The task, Johnson said later, engendered "awesome and exacting responsibilities." For Shriver, the situation was reminiscent of the day, four years before, when President Kennedy had authorized him to organize the Peace

43 John Kenneth Galbraith wrote to the President, "you have shown what I feel sure will one day be called the Johnson genius for getting the right man in the right job." Letter from John K. Galbraith to The President, February 27, 1964; Remarks of the President at Swearing-in Ceremony of Honorable Sargent Shriver as Director of OEO, White House, October 16, 1964.

Corps, which became one of the most successful and admired government operations. At that time Shriver had called in the best talent available. Now, on February 1, he took the same course of action.

On Sunday, February 2, Shriver held a meeting at his Maryland home with Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon, and Adam Yarmolinsky, one of Defense Secretary McNamara's top advisors. Two days later Shriver organized an all-day conference devoted to preliminary planning. Present were: Heller and his aide William Capron; Yarmolinsky; John Kenneth Galbraith; Richard Boone; Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor; the Undersecretary of HEW, Wilber Cohen; Michael Harrington; Paul Ylvisaker; writer Paul Jacobs; John Baker and James Sundquist, two Agriculture specialists on rural problems; Minneapolis mayor Arthur Naftalin; Frank Mankiewicz of the Peace Corps; Justice Department legal expert Norbert Schlei; Donald Petrie of Avis Rent-a-Car; Virgil Martin of Carson, Pirie & Scott; Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO; Richard Goodwin from the White House staff; and James Dixon, president of Antioch College.

The conference agreed on a three point attack: to emphasize the concept of individual economic independence; to build around the theory that poverty was cyclical; and to focus on the young. The conferees decided to delegate responsibilities according to areas. Thus, Labor was to handle jobs and training, HEW would deal with educational and health problems, and Agriculture would develop special rural programs.45

Then began the task of forming the official Task Force to draft the President's special message on poverty, and put together the legislation.

"We propose," said one of the first memora of the storm of papers that descended upon Shriver during the early hectic days, to take poverty seriously." Such was the sentiment of the President's Task Force on Poverty (dubbed by Washington wags as the "Poor Corps"), although gravity was given comic relief at the Peace Corps building when "there were suddenly a lot of guys in funny shoes running around the corridors." It was a time of chaos and exhaustion when energies were fueled by excitement and exhilaration--itself, at times, the product of a kind of hysteria--"the beautiful hysteria of it all," as one participant put it."47

46 Memorandum from Messrs. Harrington, Jacobs, Mankiewicz to R. Sargent Shriver, entitled, "The Long-Term View."

47 "Crossfire in the War on Poverty," Time Magazine, May 13, 1966; "Poverty, U.S.A.," Newsweek, February 17, 1964; The official Task Force members were the following: Andrew Brimmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce; William Capron, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisors; Ronald Goldfarb, Justice Department; Richard Goodwin, International Peace Corps Secretariat; David Hackett, Justice Department; Harold Horowitz, Associate General Counsel, HHS; Frank Mankiewicz; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor; Anne Oppenheimer, analyst, Bureau of the Budget; Norbert Shlei, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice; Milton Semer, General Counsel, CFP, HHS; James L. Sundquist, Deputy Undersecretary of Agriculture; Christopher Weeks, analyst, Bureau of the Budget; Stephen Pollak, Office of the Solicitor General; Eric Tolmach, Labor Department; and Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
Hyman Bookbinder, later Assistant Director of OEO, recalled the early days of the Task Force as "chaotic, hectic, unorganized, disorganized, but also historically productive." There was a "constant traffic of people. Government people were in and out of the fifth floor of the Peace Corps building. At one point traffic got so heavy that Shriver said we have to find some more rooms, and we found some on the 12th floor."\(^{48}\)

The Task Force began its work at the Peace Corps building. Later, it was to move to the old Federal Court of Claims building; then to the basement of the unused Emergency Hospital; then to the New Colonial Hotel; and finally to the newly constructed Brown Building, its present headquarters. The move from the Court of Claims was forced: one afternoon, an engineer notified the planners that there was a crack in the structure (excavation was underway next door), and that everyone had to vacate within two hours. Eighty people, who had crammed into the building on an ad hoc basis, went streaming out, arms flowing with folders and papers. By Monday, the Task Force was implanted in the Emergency Hospital in what had been the basement morgue.

On the day he accepted the job to head the war on poverty, Shriver telephoned Michael Harrington, and asked him to come to Washington. At a luncheon meeting, Shriver put the following question to the author of The Other America: "Now you tell me how I abolish poverty?"

\(^{48}\) Interview conducted by Bennett Schiff with Hyman Bookbinder, July 9, 1968.
"You've got to understand right away," Harrington said bluntly, "that you've been given nickels and dimes for this program. You'll have less than a billion dollars to work with."

"Well," said Shriver dryly and characteristically, "I don't know about you, Mr. Harrington, but this will be my first experience at spending a billion dollars, and I'm quite excited about it." 49

"In a sense," recalled Bookbinder, "that was what everyone on the Task Force was asking themselves and everyone else, paraphrasing Shriver's famous question, 'How do you fight a war on poverty, what are you supposed to do, and what do you do?'

In six weeks time, the Task Force had answered the question, completing both the Special Message on Poverty, and the specifics of the bill that created by law the Office of Economic Opportunity. Also completed was a Congressional presentation entitled "The War on Poverty," which provided the first systematic explanation of the programs, and contained the first budget estimate of $962.5 million. The hard nucleus of the Task Force had met around the clock with representatives of business, labor, education, and government to sort out and design the program.

"It was soon clear," an early participant said, "that even though there were different emphases on the poverty problem, the problem was not the kind that could be licked by one great gimmick or one great

49 "The money figures that are being talked about are utterly unrealistic in view of the goals authorized," said Harrington. "New York could absorb that much just on the problem of the Negro." "Poverty, U.S.A.," Newsweek, February 17, 1964, p. 38; An administration official called it a "band-aid" program. Seligman, Poverty as a Public Issue, pp. 5-6; Raskin, "Generalissimo," pp. 84-91.
brilliant program. It was a multi-pronged problem leading to a multi-
pronged program. That basic concept was eventually accepted and
there were literally dozens of thoughtful ideas to discuss this, dis-

"It kind of pulled us together, and I think from that point on all of
those involved looked at it more or less this way: Who is it in this
country that needs the help? What is available? What is not avail-
able, and what priorities should we select among those who need help?"

The New York Times reported later that "when Shriver presided
over the task force some of the in-fighting over who would do what
got so bitter that it appeared the whole project might be wrecked.
'Sometimes the walls dripped with blood as the empire-builders clashed
with the empire-wreckers,' one official reports."51

The reference was to the working out of arrangements involving
the established 21 government agencies dealing with the U.S. Welfare
system in some 200 federal projects, many of which were already over-
lapped and interlocked. The Task Force had decided to set up a separ-
ate agency within the Executive Office to control major programs, while
supervising others operating at federal, state and local levels. The

50 Time Interview, Tolmach & Bookbinder.

problem was not with the Secretaries of Departments involved, according to Hyman Bookbinder, but with the hundreds of key officials who attended the dozens of meetings day after day and who resisted what they considered to be the beginnings of a gradual dissolution of the prerogatives of their departments.

A letter from Budget Director Kermit Gordon to Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), dated March 20, 1964, gives some idea of the number of programs and other federal agencies involved in existing poverty legislation at the time. Gordon listed as examples the Departments of Agriculture; Health, Education and Welfare; Commerce; Interior; Labor; Housing and Home Finance Agency; and the Veterans Administration.

HEW alone, for example, had legislation covering aid to federally affected school areas, vocational education, maternal and child welfare, public assistance payments and services, including medical care; vocational rehabilitation, construction and operation of Indian Health facilities. There was also new legislation, Gordon pointed out, that authorized HEW to administer 14 other programs.

Dr. Joseph A. Kershaw, former provost of Williams College and economist for the Rand Corporation, came to OEO to set up a computerized cost analysis system and to help figure out how the War Against Poverty could get the best possible return for its dollars. He and Leon Gilgoff compiled a book three inches thick, listing for the first

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time in the government's history, the names of all Federal programs to aid the poor. There was an entire library of affecting legislation for the programs, a legal labyrinth which was remarkable even in that tortuous field.

Kershaw's recruitment typified the Shriver method of OEO Task Force induction. "I was sitting on a veranda last September (1964) at Martha's Vineyard," Kershaw recalled, "when the phone rang. 'My name is Sargent Shriver,' a voice said. 'We're going to spend a lot of money.'"

In the early days most decisions leading up to the President's poverty message and submission of legislation went as consensus recommendations to the White House. Early compromises involved the dispensation of authority, and it was resolved that the new agency was to have central and executive authority over a number of independent programs. Where other programs fit logically into the framework of existing agencies, authority would then be delegated.

The Program Proposed

By the time President Johnson delivered his message to Congress on March 16, most issues were resolved. On that day, the President


asked for a new agency, and declared his intention of appointing Sargent Shriver to be its Director. In the message, he outlined the specific objectives of the war. Assembled in a basic five point plan, the strategy was based on the theory that by broadening the base of abundance, new industry, higher production, and higher earnings and income would result. The proposed legislation, a multi-pronged comprehensive package, would provide educational opportunities for the millions of underprivileged young, give communities the chance to mobilize their own programs, enable the privileged youth of the nation to redirect the idealism of the Peace Corps type to domestic needs, assist in the destruction of barriers that reduce farmers and laborers to poverty, and combine the nation's talents and resources under one agency in a "concerted attack on poverty."

"The war on poverty," the President continued, "is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance. It is an effort to allow them to develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to develop and use ours, so that they can share, as others share, in the promise of the nation."

The nation should embark on the program, the President concluded, because it was right that it should, and also because "helping some will increase the prosperity of all. Our fight against poverty will be an investment in the most valuable of our resources--the skills and strength of our people. And in the future, as in the past, this
on the following day, the House Committee on Education and Labor began hearings on H.R. 10440, entitled the Economic Opportunity Act. In 1961 Shriver had gone to see every single Congressman and Senator to tell the Peace Corps story. Before the War Against Poverty bill became law, he was to duplicate that remarkable feat; but this time it was more difficult.

The draft legislation contained six titles embodying programs to be coordinated by the Office of Economic Opportunity. It authorized appropriations of $962.5 million for the fiscal year 1965. The thrust of the program against poverty was to be along a broad, ten-point front: income tax cuts, civil rights, regional development, urban and rural community rehabilitation, youth programs, teenage vocational training and basic educational programs, and hospital insurance for the aged.

The Office of Economic Opportunity, the headquarters for the new war, was to be the President's managerial arm which could cut across Departmental lines to facilitate coordination. Shriver, testifying before the House Committee, stated that "it was an authority which the President wants because he wants to be at the focal


56 An unsigned and undated memorandum entitled "ANEC(sic)DOTES," states: "Insiders agree that two persons, seldom mentioned, played a key role at important points in the initial days. They credited Abe Fortas with urging on the President the creation of a separate executive office to coordinate and operate War on Poverty programs, rather than permit them to be parts of traditional governmental bureaus." (p.5).
point with respect to this aspect of our domestic effort." A pre-
cedent existed for this unique position. By the terms of the Execu-
tive Reorganization Act of 1939, and the recommendations of the Com-
mittee on Administration Management, President Roosevelt had promoted
the cause of scientific management and established tools for a na-
tional governing body in initiating bureaucratic changes. A 1937 re-
port provided guidelines for future executive reorganization, one of
which was the need to install coordinating "managerial arms" for the
President in the area of personnel, fiscal policy, and national plan-
ing. These were to be at a level between the President and his Cab-
inet. 57

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was a multi-faceted constell-
ation of projects. Title I embodied three proposals: a Job Corps that
would provide work experience and training for youths in conservation
camps and residential training centers; work-training programs to pro-
vide employment to youths aged 16-21 in their immediate locale; and
a work-study program designed for college youths from low-income fami-
lies.

Title II established a federally financed community action program
to assist state, local private and local public non-profit agencies to
combat poverty locally. Title III would give grants to farmers for
agricultural materials, loans to farmers to set up non-agricultural
enterprises, and loans to cooperatives to assist low-income families.

57 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 263-264; Time
Interview, Tolmach and Bookbinder; House Committee on Education and
Labor Hearings, p. 21.
It would also erect farm development corporations which would provide for a more economic transfer of land to low-income farmers. Title IV would establish incentive loans to individuals who would then hire the hard-core unemployed. It would also enable small businessmen exempted from Small Business Association loan terms to receive assistance.

Title V set up job training programs for the heads of households on public assistance, and Title VI created the Office of Economic Opportunity and its administration, as well as a volunteer national service organization entitled "Volunteers for America." The program, under the supervision and direction of the Office of Economic Opportunity, contained a three year projected authorization. 58

While the program embodied programs resembling the CCC and the NYA, it was not meant to be simply a reincarnation of the New Deal. The New Deal had provided social services to relieve want and distress; the war on poverty, on the other hand, aimed at "expanding choices and enlarging human freedoms," and to open the doors "into the main edifice of our economy" to everyone, regardless of skills. Underlying the act was the assumption that success and achievement in American society should be available to those willing to work. The Council of Economic Advisors' report had noted that the proposed programs were designed "to equip and to permit the poor of the nation to produce and to earn...the American standard of living by their own efforts..."

and contributions."

A second assumption was that success in the war on poverty rested largely upon a rapid and steady economic growth, increasing employment opportunity and raising the demand for labor. The quality of the labor supply, it was felt, could be raised to meet the changing labor demand through education, training and retraining. Title I of the act was specifically addressed to that precondition.

**The Legislation**

During the hearings in Congress, critics noted that many of the programs either incorporated or extended "activities that had been operated in large scale or in prototype at some point in the past," or which had direct analogies in ongoing programs. Opponents gave notice that consideration of specific programs had been made before the respective bodies in the past. For example, VISTA resembled the National Service Corps and the Peace Corps; a work-study feature of the National Defense Education Act had failed due to opposition by educators; a job corps and work-training project of the 1963 Youth Employment Opportunity Act was killed in the House Rules Committee; the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 contained community action provisions; and so on.

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60 Myrdal, Poverty as a Public Issue, p. vii.

Precedents also existed in privately-sponsored projects such as the Ford Foundation urban community action planning and the North Carolina Fund state-wide programs. Ad hoc local groups had previously operated their own version of tutoring programs, while the Opportunity Industrial Corporation, headed by Leon Sullivan, an activist Negro minister, had conducted education, retraining, and job placement programs in poverty-stricken areas of Philadelphia. The NAACP had for years engaged in financing sharecroppers, the National Urban League had supervised retraining projects, and the Southern Regional Council since 1945 had overseen programs similar to those within the act.\footnote{John H. Wheeler, "Civil Rights Groups--Their Impact Upon the War on Poverty," \textit{Antipoverty Programs}, p. 154.}

Daniel Moynihan, one of the original task force group, recalled that prior to and during the Task Force days, the initial impulse "within the second echelon of the government was simply to launch a greatly expanded community action program, following the models already in action." Other considerations, however, had led to more diverse programs. Another task force member stated that barring the community action section of the act, much of the rest was "made up of items which could not get through Congress separately." While President Kennedy had tried to get a job corps through Congress under the Department of Labor, and had failed, "it was felt by President Johnson that this was a good opportunity to put a number of things together in a package and get them through Congress, and he did just that."\footnote{Moynihan, "Three Problems," p. 43; Boone, "Community Action;" One Task Force participant explained the multi-program package as the result of what the members thought could get through Congress. \textit{Time Interview}, Tolmach and Bookbinder.}
During the hearings, spokesmen for the Administration took pains to distinguish between antecedent programs and legislation and the present act. Ample testimony explaining the advantages of coordination, unification, and interagency cooperation was given by Shriver, Celebrezze, Wirtz and others who urged the necessity of an omnibus approach. The major thrust of the program, Shriver told the House committee, was contained in Title II, the community action program. Its purpose was to "change institutions as well as people." It challenged "hostile or uncaring or exploitive institutions," attempting to make them responsive to the peculiar needs of the "whole community."

Title II departed from traditional federal welfare approaches by placing main responsibility on local communities, the reasons being that local leadership was more in touch with indigent problems, it would be more acceptable to the states, and that it enabled communities to unify through widespread local participation.

While the bill was before Congress, the President waged a vigorous campaign to solicit public support. Diverse organizations enlisted in the cause, from the Daughters of the American Revolution to the Socialist Party. The President appealed to the people and their repre-

64 See Hearings on H.R. 10440, pp. 16-17, 20-21; Boone said: "There were no specific designs thought of when the architects built the maximum feasible participation clause, only later in terms of its implementation did it tend to take two forms in local community action programs." Eric Tilmach recalls that no one for sure knew precisely what the phrase meant, or what would happen. The concept was speculative, undefined in the bill itself, and resulted from the "feeling" that some new element had to be infused into the program. Boone, "Community Action;" Interview with Eric Tilmach, June 28, 1968.

sentatives, personally visiting poverty-stricken regions, highlighting conditions, and reminding Congressmen of their responsibilities to their constituents. In some cities and states he promised federal aid as soon as the bill passed. In May, Johnson called for the country to build a "Great Society," based on a "creative federalism between the national capital and the leaders of local communities." A month later, before the AFL-CIO Communications Workers convention, he announced the objectives of the Great Society: no one would be "the victim of fear or poverty or hatred. . . .and no person, no group, no party is going to stand in the way of that forward march." In a very real sense, a writer has observed, the poverty program "would be the test case to see whether the battle standards of the Great Society could be raised up in place of the somewhat tattered flags of the New Frontier." 66

During the summer of 1964 the nation was "deluged with vivid descriptions of the life of the poor, statistical accounts of their number and characteristics, and details of their geographic location." Poverty—the issue, not the reality—became "fashionable," according to Dwight MacDonald, who noted that even the Saturday Evening Post ran a lead article running to twelve pages entitled "The Invisible Americans." In April the House Committee on Education and Labor published a report on Poverty in the United States. Senator Clark (D-Pa.) held a sub-

66 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 253-256; Weeks, in Job Corps, writes, ". . . the master chef who compiled the ingredients and supervised as they were blended into one chef d'oeuvre was Lyndon Baines Johnson. And the political gourmets knew this. In an election year, this was the bill which would show whether the new President's magic worked only because Congress felt charged with a responsibility to fulfill the Kennedy legacy, or whether Johnson had the persuasive power to realize his own legislative initiatives." p. 10.
committee investigation on unemployment, and Hubert Humphrey's name appeared on a book entitled War on Poverty, which quoted Scripture, Michael Harrington, and gave official recognition to the theory of the culture of poverty whereby generations bequeath poverty to their progeny "with almost genetic certainty." John Kenneth Galbraith, who less than a decade before had dismissed poverty in a short chapter of his Affluent Society, now wrote in Harpers magazine that the impoverished must be rescued from their plight, and in their rescue "a steady expansion in economic output (and) a broad and equitable distribution of services" would be required. By the time Adam Clayton Powell brought the bill to a vote in the House Committee, an emergent public interest generated by the media had developed.67

Eighty-five witnesses testified in the twenty-five days of hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor. Nine opposed the bill--three represented the Chamber of Commerce, one was a state manufacturing association delegate, and another was from the Farm Bureau Federation--"lobbies whose opposition to any form of government spending on social welfare and education is a basic ritual" performed regularly. Two of the remaining four were Republican members of the Joint Economic Committee whose minority report had accused the Council of Economic Advisors' report of exaggerating the extent of poverty in the country. The remaining two were educators who felt the bill was misdirected and its programs unnecessary.

Of the remaining seventy-six witnesses, twelve were technical
advisors representing government statistical services and whose tes-
timony was unrelated to the merits of the bill. Twenty-nine were
members of the administration or original members of the task force.
The remainder represented social-welfare, civic and religious organi-
zations, state and local governments, and businesses. 68

Opposition to the bill came from expected quarters. From the
first, Republican committee members served notice that the poverty bill
would not get bipartisan support. Representative Peter Frelinghuysen
(R-N.J.) labeled the bill a potpourri of stale ideas previously re-
jected by Congress. The new bill, he announced, would produce con-
fusion of purpose, create a "poverty czar," and usurp the authority
of Cabinet officers. On April 28, Frelinghuysen introduced his own
anti-poverty bill, authorizing a program to be administered by the
States under HEW, funded at $1.5 billion for three years. States were
to assume one-third of the costs, and 50% of the funds were to be
spent on educational programs. 69

Richard Nixon, at an April press conference, called the war on
poverty a "cruel hoax." Those who would make such criticisms, Johnson
retorted, were the sort "who would turn the American dream into a night-
mare." GOP House Committee members Dave Martin (R-Neb.) and M.G. Snyder
(R-Ky.) also attacked the President's sincerity in the war. "The Pre-
sident's poverty campaign is nothing more than an election year gimmick,"
they asserted. Shriver, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on

69 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 16.
Labor and Public Welfare, replied to the charge with the words:

"I think that if the national administration had failed to propose this bill, just because it was afraid that someone would say it was an election year gimmick, as they have, then I would think the Federal Government would be derelict in its responsibility." 70

New York's Governor Rockefeller, campaigning for the GOP Presidential nomination, branded the administration's poverty war as a "public relations effort to distract people's attention" from its failure to provide more jobs. It was an outdated program, he continued, more "keyed to the problems of the depressed thirties, not the challenge of the sixties. In an advanced, automated economy, a youngster cannot learn useful jobs out in the woods with an axe."

If the liberal wing of the GOP was critical of technique, the conservative element struck at the programs' substance. In arguments reminiscent of the late 19th century Social Darwinist view of the poor, conservatives maintained that poverty was the result of individual fault and not environment. "The fact is," said Barry Goldwater,"that most people who have no skill, have had no education for the same reason--low intelligence or low ambition." People must earn, and want to earn, any social and economic benefits they receive. In American society, he continued, a person receives rewards by "merit and not by fiat." To be sure, everyone was entitled to an opportunity for education and earnings ("in keeping with the value of their work"), but he

did not believe that "the mere fact of having little money entitles everybody, regardless of circumstances, to be permanently maintained by the taxpayers at an average or comfortable standard of living." 71

Throughout the summer of 1964, the bill passed through the Congressional grist-mill, undergoing slight alteration under sometimes hostile scrutiny. Administration witnesses, testifying on behalf of the proposed legislation, presented a united front to committee members, citing the advantages of each respective provision. Executive officers testified that the whole Johnson Cabinet was behind the bill, while Secretary of Commerce Hodges said in reply to queries about potential departmental conflict, "I'm not scared of anyone taking anything away from me." NEW Secretary Anthony Celebrezze painted a rosy picture of interdepartmental cooperation, denying that Mr. Shriver would dominate other government agencies. If successful war was to be waged on poverty, he said, it was necessary to have a commanding general. 72

Secretary of Labor Wirtz pacified committee fears about the exclusion of religious groups from the community action programs, and Hodges suggested that Title IV would be a useful experiment to test


72 Cited in Liston, Sargent Shriver, pp. 207-208; The sources for the 1964 legislative history of the Economic Opportunity Act include the following: H.R. 10440, Administration Draft bill; H.R. 11050, Frelinghauzen's bill; H.R. 10443, Powell's bill; H.R. 11377, clean bill reported by House Committee; House Report # 1458; S. 2642, Administration draft; Senate Report # 1218; S. 2642 Subcommittee print; Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Poverty War Program of the House Education and Labor Hearings; House Committee on Agriculture Hearings; House Rules Committee Hearings; Senate Select Subcommittee on Poverty of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee Hearings.
the merits of private enterprise's participation in the poverty war. Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, praised the Job Corps as a needed adjunct to the Forest Service, and said that urban pressures could be relieved through the grant and loan program to farmers. Speculative pressures from large-scale farming operations had caused undue inflation of farm land values, and the farm development corporations, envisaged by Title III, would make available to small farmers good farm land at lower prices and would act as an incentive to rural development. 73

Criticisms and objections to specific portions of the bill generally followed partisan lines, as did the actual voting. In the House Committee, Representative Charles Goodell (R-N.Y.) questioned the absence of a prohibition against aid to religious groups. Robert Taft, Jr., (R-Ohio) felt that the community action programs ignored the proper federal-state relationships. Roman Pucinski (D-Ill.) compared the farm development corporations scheme with "the type of farming we most often criticize behind the Iron Curtain," while Peter Frelinghuysen said the bill charted "a new and unjustified course for governmental responsibility in general and for the Federal role in particular." He objected to a new federal bureaucracy whose influence would "permeate every nook and cranny of civic responsibility--public and private."

In the Senate, the senior Senator from New York, Jacob Javits, would have preferred to have the government declare a joint war with the states, instead of a federal war alone. Senators John Tower (R-Tex.) and Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) saw the bill as yet another example of federal intru-

73 Hearings on H.R. 10440.
sion into state and local matters, "complete and untrammeled." Some complained that the bill had been hastily drawn together, and Shriver's testimony confirmed that the draft had, indeed, been compiled in six weeks. Carl Madden, a Chamber of Commerce researcher, reported that a task force consultant seeking his cooperation had confessed, "we haven't got time to study; we have to act."74

Major objections in both the House and Senate Committees' minority reports focused on the duplication of existing programs, the undermining of federal-state relations, and the confusions that would result from a new bureaucracy. In the House, the program was seen as a rehash of older, sometimes rejected ideas gathered together for political purposes. The farm development corporations would institute "agrarian land reform," and the programs bypassed the very old and very young. The Goldwater-Tower Senate minority report wielded a sharper axe. The Administration's technique in ram-rodding the bill through Congress recalled "Madison Avenue" and "The Wizard of Oz" practices. It was a "poverty grab-bag," based on obsolete programs, which treated the results and "not the causes of poverty." Some of its programs were totally "alien to the best traditions of our country."75

Shriver, in response to criticism of the political aspect of the OEO program, replied: "For six months we had our sign out like a


75 Ibid.
lawyer's shingle, begging for constructive ideas on how to wage this war... Those who have challenged the substantive parts of our program have been asked by me to come up with something better. For a half-year I've been saying, 'If you've got a better mousetrap, show us,' and they proposed nothing. Our program has been almost unanimously endorsed by economists and by an extraordinary cross-section of business leaders--men who certainly would not lend themselves to any crass vote-getting scheme."

To some extent outside pressures and events hastened the passage of the bill. During a delay in the House hearings, the President, capitalizing on a New York World's Fair speech, subtly reminded Harlem Representative and Committee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell of his obligations by announcing a one million dollar grant to HARYOU. The *New York Times* reported the grant was contingent upon passage of the bill. In the wake of the summer race riots and subsequent appeal by Mayor Wagner for more federal anti-poverty funds, the *New York Times*, describing the bill as an "anti-riot" measure, cautioned members of the committees to bear that in mind when it came time for a vote.

During the summer both major political parties held nominating conventions. The Republican Party platform contained a plank condemning the poverty program as overlapping with and contradicting the "42 existing Federal poverty programs," and charged that the program "would dangerously centralize Federal controls." The Democrats, of course,

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76 Cited in Raskin, "Generalissimo," pp. 91-92.

gave unqualified endorsement, pledging to "carry the war on poverty as a total war against the causes of human want." Shriver had eloquently summarized for the delegates the meaning of poverty, and he described the Democrats as the party which historically "cared and acted" for the poor. The President's program was no hoax or gimmick, he assured the Convention, but a practical effort to enable the unfortunate to get back on their feet, turning "relief-receivers into taxpayers." The war on poverty was "the challenge to our generation—to build a world for our children in which relief is unknown and opportunities are unlimited." 78

In August, the House vote on the bill depended on a bloc of undecided Congressmen who fell loosely into two affiliated groups. A dozen moderate to liberal Republicans, sympathetic to the aims of the program, and impressed by Shriver's Peace Corps record, faced the dilemma that it was a Democratic bill backed by a Democratic President. These same Republicans had been "flattened by the Goldwater steamroller" at the GOP Convention weeks earlier. Democrats in the other group, from marginal Southern states, "concentrated in the North Carolina delegation," recognized the need for an omnibus poverty program in their home districts. They had just been "badly torn by the bloody fight over the Civil Rights Act of 1964." They had to decide whether to support a bill which Southern critics complained was designed to force compliance with the Civil Rights act. 79


79 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 11-17.
Two key events resolved the issue and won support from the undecided bloc. A bargain was struck between conservation lobby groups and top aides in the task force, whereby a percentage of Job Corps enrollees would be consigned to a Youth Conservation Corps in return for active support for the bill by the lobbies. The other event involved the jettisoning of Adam Yarmolinsky, the man "who had been even more instrumental than Shriver in designing the structure of the poverty bill." At a critical point in the voting, Representative William Ayres (R-Ohio) attacked Yarmolinsky, quoting an internal memo implying that Defense Department funds were being used to build and equip Job Corps centers before the bill had passed. Representative Phil Landrum (D-Ga.) then announced that Yarmolinsky would be excluded from the operations of the OEO, "on the highest authority."80

Christopher Weeks, a task force member, noted that "the Southern Democrats had asked for and gotten their pound of flesh—assurance that the abrasive, intellectual Jew of Russian extraction who had roughed up the military rank and file in the Defense Department, and who was reputed to have been responsible for orders forcing base commanders in the South to declare segregated facilities in nearby towns off-limits to servicemen, would thereafter be barred from any job in Johnson's poverty agency."81

The House passed the bill, after three days of debate, by a roll-call vote of 226-184 on August 8, 1964. Three days later the Senate

80 Congressional Record, House, August 7, 1964, p. 17996.
81 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 16-17.
followed suit, by a vote of 61-34. Changes in the original form of the bill were slight. Minority opposition had introduced a gubernatorial veto of the location of the Job Corps centers and the stationing of VISTA volunteers within the confines of a state. Citing the experience of the New York Mobilization for Youth, staffed by "left-wingers" and indulging in anti-establishment activity, a Dixiecrat/Northern Republican coalition inserted a loyalty oath requirement into the bill. The idea of a single "community action program" executed by a "community action organization" was deleted, as well as the requirement that the agency receiving funds be "broadly representative of the community." The clause was revised to allow grants to "components of a community action program" without reference to the concurrent planning of a single, carefully planned, community-wide program. By a single deletion, "pork-barrel legislation was produced that no longer made local grants contingent upon the creation of a community-wide administration and the formation of an overall development program." Also, direct grants to agricultural workers were eliminated, as were "land reform" measures. Farm cooperatives were forbidden aid if they engaged in agricultural production or for manufacturing purposes. 82

President Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 on August 20, declaring:

Today for the first time in all the history of the human race, a great nation is able to make and is willing to make a commitment to eradicate poverty among its people.

Whatever our situation in life, whatever our partisan affiliation, we can be grateful and proud that we are able to pledge ourselves this morning to this historic course. We can be especially proud of the nature of the commitments that we are making.

This is not in any sense a cynical proposal to exploit the poor with a promise of a hand-out or a dole.

We know—we learned long ago—that answer is no answer.

The measure before me this morning for signature offers the answer that its title implies—the answer of opportunity. For the purpose of the Economic Act of 1964 is to offer opportunity, not an opiate.

...We are not content to accept the endless growth of relief rolls or welfare rolls. We want to offer the forgotten fifth of our people opportunity and not doles.

That is what this measure does for our times.83

The Act was the first major legislation proposed by the President to be passed by the Congress.

Funding the Program

A subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee began hearings on August 14.84 Shriver asked for $947.5, the full amount auth-

83 Remarks of the President Upon the Signing of S. 2642 - Poverty Bill, in the Rose Garden, August 20, 1964; The entire program, Robert Theobald complained, reflected a dire "lack of research. We don't know enough. ...we are flying blind." Theobald, "Johnson's War on Poverty," New Politics, Fall 1964; Time commented that the war reflected "the uniquely American belief. ...that evangelism, money and organization can lick just about anything, including conditions that the world has always considered inevitable." "The Poor Amidst Prosperity," October 1, 1965; and Paul Jacobs noted that the program was conceived in "an almost mystical belief in the infinite potentials of American society. Poverty, like polio, will be defeated when the right vaccine is found." Jacobs, "America's Schizophrenic View of the Poor," 201 Nation 191, 196 (1965).

84 The following is taken from Hearings before the Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, HEW, and Related Agencies, of the House Appropriations Committee, 1964.
orized by the Act. In his opening statement Shriver stressed three points: the efforts which had gone into the preparation of the request for funds; why the program needed the full amount; and the low overhead involved in the nature of the program.

To substantiate his points Shriver said the anti-poverty programs were developed by "the best men we could find in America, both in and out of Government, irrespective of party." Called in, he went on to explain, were representatives of business, labor, education; state, city and county officials; and experts from the voluntary agencies working in the field. All of these experts, Shriver said, working in conjunction with officials of the Departments of Labor, Interior, Agriculture, HEW, Justice and the Small Business Administration, had conferred on and approved the budget estimates which were before the committee. "Sums requested for programs to be delegated to one of the departments are the product of coordinated efforts of personnel of that agency and the task force. In each case the pertinent department strenuously supports the request for funds," he said.

"The funds requested," he said, "will be used to establish needed new programs such as the Job Corps, work-training and work-study programs, community action programs, adult basic education programs, and the VISTA volunteers program. In certain cases the funds will be used to broaden existing pilot programs which have proved their worth; for example, the loan programs of the Farmers Home Administration and the work-experience program of the Bureau of Family Services of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Each of these programs is sound; each is practical. Each will meet a proven need." From the moment when the President sent the bill to Congress, "we have planned for operations beginning September 1. We have continually reviewed these plans and are prepared to go ahead on that schedule. To meet our goals we need and will obligate every single dollar authorized and included in these budget estimates." Finally, Shriver emphasized that it was a low-overhead program designed to avoid a "giant Federal bureaucracy." Major development and administrative tasks were to be carried out at the local and state levels.

Shriver denied, as he had in previous hearings, that the program would duplicate existing efforts, emphasizing that it had the full support of all related government departments. It should be obvious, he said, they would not approve of programs which conflicted with their established and ongoing operations.

It was true, Shriver said, that there were three important national groups who were opposed to the program: the National Association of Manufacturers; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the American Farm Bureau Federation. But he added, "they were conspicuous in their opposition because they were among the very few that did oppose."

During the series of extended hearings Shriver went on, point by point, to answer criticism and reply to detailed questioning. The program had the support of both a committee and the Council of Governors and the full U.S. Conference of Mayors. During the first day
of hearings, Shriver stressed the constructive nature of the pro-
gram and its basic difference from the entrenched welfare system:

I think the problem some people have when they look at this bill or hear about it, is that they think of it as a relief pro-
gram, they think we are going to take money from the rich and
give it to the poor or just hand out checks to people.

That is not the intent of this bill and under its provisions it would not be possible to do that in any case.

One of the reasons we call it the economic opportunity pro-
gram (is) to emphasize the fact it is not a relief program. This
is a program which opens up new opportunities and new changes for people who need a chance to get out of poverty and that is why it has such a heavy emphasis on job training, education, and local community action.

Supported by testimony from U.S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, representatives of Federal departments and key members of his Task Force, Shriver went on to explain major points of the different sections of the Act. On the subject of the community action program, the core of the Administration's anti-poverty war, Shriver said:

I can just say the objective of the community action program is to get action initiated against poverty at the point closest to where the poor people live by encouraging and inspiring local governmental units, and local private voluntary agencies to ini-
tiate programs at the local level.

The philosophy behind this is that poverty can be analyzed and combatted best by those who are closest to it; so, rather than putting the individual communities of the United States in a planning straitjacket originated here, or in a state capitol, we are trying to take this responsibility as close to the local gov-
ernment level as we can.  

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85 This profound and innovative concept of basic social participation—one of the most controversial of OEO’s programs—had been written into the 1964 Act, requiring Community Action Agencies to be "developed, con-
ducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of re-
sidents of the areas and members of the groups involved." A full dis-
cussion of the intent, derivation and application of the phrase follows in a subsequent chapter.
Issues examined during the hearings included poverty in rural areas, grants for program development, technical assistance grants, the migrant agricultural employees program, loans in the agricultural sector, the adult literacy program, VISTA, the administrative structure of OEO and its costs, the relation of the program to the Manpower Development and Training Act, Aid for Dependent Children, the possibility of funds being used to buy educational toys (it was explained that this might come under a community action program and would have to be reviewed as such), review procedure for community action grant applications, requirements for matching local contributions (10 percent would be required, either in cash or in equivalent staff-services or facilities), cost per Job Corps enrollee, aid for Indians, consultant fees, and others.

"I think," said subcommittee Chairman John E. Fogarty (D-R.I.) in concluding the day's hearings, "you have done a good job today in justifying this appropriation. I wish you a lot of luck. You will need it."

Reported Shriver, "I think we will."

On September 17, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 12633 which contained the FY 1965 appropriations for OEO. The Committee recommended an appropriation of $750 million (a reduction of $197.5 million from the request) because "it is obvious that when this program was planned it was expected that it would be implemented much earlier than is now going to be the fact," and that it would take a "considerable amount of time to recruit all the staff necessary." The
House passed the appropriations bill by a roll call vote of 209-103 on September 22. It defeated an amendment proposed by Representative Ben F. Jensen (R-Iowa), which would have reduced the appropriation to $650 million.

The Senate Appropriations Committee began hearing testimony on the budget on August 15, with Shriver making the point immediately that "we planned right from the beginning... on an operation which would start September 1, not July 1." Another Senate hearing was held on September 22, and again Shriver made an attempt to clarify the budget estimates by pointing out they were predicated on a September beginning and not on the customary fiscal year basis of July 1 to June 30. On September 29, the Senate Committee recommended an appropriation of $861.5 million, an increase of $111.5 million over the House figure and a reduction of $85.95 million from the Administration request. The Senate passed its bill on October 1. The House-Senate Conference Committee followed with a report appropriating $800 million for the program. The bill (H.R. 12633) was finally cleared on October 3, the last day of the session. The President signed the measure on October 7, and OEO began formal operations on October 8.

The Targets and the Design

In its first Congressional presentation of March 17, 1965, OEO described the six groups from whom "the community of poverty" was largely drawn: the children of poverty; those by-passed by industrial

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86 See the first Congressional Presentation, War on Poverty (OEO publication), March 17, 1964.
change; rural families; minority group members; fatherless families; the aged.

While the list was not all inclusive, the report said, it was clear that most of the nation's poor shared one or more of the characteristics included in it and that "together, they constitute what must be recognized, even by the skeptical, as a stubborn core of poverty in the United States."

Toward these targets of opportunity, the report said, its programs would:

- stimulate our communities to initiate comprehensive action programs attacking the roots of poverty;

- expand the opportunities for your youth to gain the education, skills, and experience they must have to become full participants in our nation's life;

- help farmers to increase their income through a program of small capital loans and grants;

- provide new employment opportunities--for the long-term unemployed--by encouraging capital investment, and new opportunities for small entrepreneurs by making credit available;

- encourage more states to orient their programs of public assistance toward rehabilitation rather than support;

- recruit and train volunteers to work with agencies carrying out the various programs.

"In short," the introduction concluded, "it is a program which can open for the young the opportunity to learn; for the able bodied, the opportunity to work; and for all, the opportunity to live in decency and dignity."